David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Quarterly 39 (156):257-275 (1989)
It is argued that if, with Dummett, we see assertion as an act governed by conditions of correctness which makes a claim to the effect that these conditions are met, then the conditions of correctness that determine its content must have the impersonal character of a requirement of truth, rather than the speaker-relative character of a requirement of justification or assertibility. For otherwise it would be impossible for different speakers to use the same words to make an assertion with the same content.
|Keywords||assertion rules communication|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
C. Peacocke (1997). Metaphysical Necessity: Understanding, Truth and Epistemology. Mind 106 (423):521-574.
Anne Bezuidenhout (2002). Truth-Conditional Pragmatics. Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):105-134.
Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (2003). Locke, Expressivism, Conditionals. Analysis 63 (1):86–92.
Stephen Barker (2011). Truth-Bearers and the Unsaid. In Ken Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic. CUP
Stephen Barker (2003). Truth and Conventional Implicature. Mind 112 (445):1-34.
Mark Crimmins (2002). Thing Talk Moonlighting. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):83 - 98.
ME Kalderon (1997). The Transparency of Truth. Mind 106 (423):475-497.
J. Salerno (2000). Revising the Logic of Logical Revision. Philosophical Studies 99 (2):211-227.
Robert J. Stainton (2006). Terminological Reflections of an Enlightened Contextualist. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):460–468.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads69 ( #52,732 of 1,781,383 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #74,670 of 1,781,383 )
How can I increase my downloads?