Why content must be a matter of truth conditions

Philosophical Quarterly 39 (156):257-275 (1989)
Abstract
It is argued that if, with Dummett, we see assertion as an act governed by conditions of correctness which makes a claim to the effect that these conditions are met, then the conditions of correctness that determine its content must have the impersonal character of a requirement of truth, rather than the speaker-relative character of a requirement of justification or assertibility. For otherwise it would be impossible for different speakers to use the same words to make an assertion with the same content.
Keywords assertion  rules  communication
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