Qualia and the Senses

Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):495-511 (2001)
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Abstract

How should we characterize the nature of perceptual experience? Some theorists claim that colour experiences, to take an example of perceptual experiences, have both intentional properties and properties called 'colour qualia', namely, mental qualitative properties which are what it is like to be conscious of colour. Since proponents of colour qualia hold that these mental properties cannot be explained in terms of causal relations, this position is in opposition to a functionalist characterization of colour experience

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Peter Ross
California State Polytechnic University, Pomona

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References found in this work

Perception: A Representative Theory.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.
Mental paint and mental latex.Ned Block - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.
Consciousness, color, and content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.
Are absent qualia impossible?Ned Block - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (2):257-74.

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