A new psychologism in logic? Reflections from the point of view of belief revision

Studia Logica 88 (1):113 - 136 (2008)
This paper addresses the question whether the past couple of decades of formal research in belief revision offers evidence of a new psychologism in logic. In the first part I examine five potential arguments in favour of this thesis and find them all wanting. In the second part of the paper I argue that belief revision research has climbed up a hierarchy of models for the change of doxastic states that appear to be clearly normative at the bottom, but are more amenable to an empirical-descriptive interpretation on higher levels. I conclude that this observation might offer a foothold for the thesis that there is a new psychologism in logic.
Keywords Philosophy   Computational Linguistics   Mathematical Logic and Foundations   Logic
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