A Problem for Hasker

Faith and Philosophy 27 (3):287-305 (2010)
Abstract
In God, Time, and Knowledge, William Hasker presents a powerful argument against “theological compatibilism,” which, in this context, refers to the view that divine foreknowledge is compatible with libertarian free will. In this paper I show that Hasker’s views on free will, as expressed in God, Time, and Knowledge, are inconsistent with his own account of hard facts. I then consider four ways to remove the inconsistency and argue that the first two are untenable for the libertarian, while the remaining two leave the theological compatibilist in a good position to respond to the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge. Along the way, I attempt to defuse Hasker’s argument that Anselmian eternalism is “fatal to libertarian free will.”
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Katherin A. Rogers (2007). Anselmian Eternalism. Faith and Philosophy 24 (1):3-27.
Bruce Reichenbach (1987). Hasker on Omniscience. Faith and Philosophy 4 (1):86-92.
Vance G. Morgan (1994). Foreknowledge and Human Freedom in Augustine. Journal of Philosophical Research 19:223-242.
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