Bounded Revision: Two-Dimensional Belief Change Between Conservative and Moderate Revision [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):173-200 (2012)
This paper presents the model of ‘bounded revision’ that is based on two-dimensional revision functions taking as arguments pairs consisting of an input sentence and a reference sentence. The key idea is that the input sentence is accepted as far as (and just a little further than) the reference sentence is ‘cotenable’ with it. Bounded revision satisfies the AGM axioms as well as the Same Beliefs Condition (SBC) saying that the set of beliefs accepted after the revision does not depend on the reference sentence (although the posterior belief state does depend on it). Bounded revision satisfies the Darwiche–Pearl (DP) axioms for iterated belief change. If the reference sentence is fixed to be a tautology or a contradiction, two well-known one-dimensional revision operations result. Bounded revision thus naturally fills the space between conservative revision (also known as natural revision) and moderate revision (also known as lexicographic revision). I compare this approach to the two-dimensional model of ‘revision by comparison’ investigated by Fermé and Rott (Artif Intell 157:5–47, 2004 ) that satisfies neither the SBC nor the DP axioms. I conclude that two-dimensional revision operations add substantially to the expressive power of qualitative approaches that do not make use of numbers as measures of degrees of belief.
|Keywords||Belief revision Two-dimensional belief change Revision by comparison Iterated revision Sphere semantics Epistemic entrenchment|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
David K. Lewis (1973). Counterfactuals. Blackwell Publishers.
Nelson Goodman (1983). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Harvard University Press.
Carlos E. Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors & David Makinson (1985). On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions. Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (2):510-530.
Hans Rott (2001). Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Oxford University Press.
Geoffrey Hellman (1989). Mathematics Without Numbers: Towards a Modal-Structural Interpretation. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Hans Rott (2008). A New Psychologism in Logic? Reflections From the Point of View of Belief Revision. Studia Logica 88 (1):113 - 136.
Similar books and articles
Giacomo Bonanno (2008). Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework. In Krzysztof Apt & Robert van Rooij (eds.), New Perspectives on Games and Interaction. Amsterdam University Press
Sven Ove Hansson, Eduardo Leopoldo Fermé, John Cantwell & Marcelo Alejandro Falappa (2001). Credibility Limited Revision. Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (4):1581-1596.
Abhaya C. Nayak, Paul Nelson & Hanan Polansky (1996). Belief Change as Change in Epistemic Entrenchment. Synthese 109 (2):143 - 174.
Giacomo Bonanno (2012). Belief Change in Branching Time: AGM-Consistency and Iterated Revision. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):201-236.
Craig Boutilier (1996). Iterated Revision and Minimal Change of Conditional Beliefs. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):263 - 305.
Eduardo L. Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson (1999). Selective Revision. Studia Logica 63 (3):331-342.
Adnan Darwiche & Judea Pearl (1997). On the Logic of Iterated Belief Revision. Artificial Intelligence 89:1-29.
Edwin D. Mares (2002). A Paraconsistent Theory of Belief Revision. Erkenntnis 56 (2):229 - 246.
John L. Pollock & Anthony S. Gillies (2000). Belief Revision and Epistemology. Synthese 122 (1-2):69-92.
Dongmo Zhang & Norman Foo (2001). Infinitary Belief Revision. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):525-570.
Sven Ove Hansson (1993). Reversing the Levi Identity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (6):637 - 669.
Brian Hill (2008). Towards a “Sophisticated” Model of Belief Dynamics. Part II: Belief Revision. Studia Logica 89 (3):291 - 323.
Added to index2012-01-21
Total downloads10 ( #227,445 of 1,724,748 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #349,121 of 1,724,748 )
How can I increase my downloads?