Capturing the Relationship Between Conditionals and Conditional Probability with a Trivalent Semantics
Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||Explains how to use a trivalent semantics to explain what is often called Adam’s Thesis, the thesis that the probability of a conditional is the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent.|
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