Dubious liaisons: A review of Alvin Goldman's liaisons: Philosophy meets the cognitive and social sciences [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 9 (2):261 – 279 (1996)
Alvin Goldman's recent collection (Goldman, 1992) includes many of the important and seminal contributions made by him over the last three decades to epistemology, philosophy of mind, and analytic metaphysics. Goldman is an acknowledged leader in efforts to put material from cognitive and social science to good philosophical use. This is the “liaison” which Goldman takes his own work to exemplify and advance. Yet the essays contained in Liaisons chart an important evolution in Goldman's own views about the relation between philosophy and empirical inquiry. Goldman raises, if only unwittingly, the question of what philosophy per se contributes to the encounter. The way in which Goldman's work problematizes the claim that philosophy forms a working liaison with the cognitive and social sciences is revealed by examining two sets of distinctions prominent in Goldman's analyses in this volume. I trace how each pair of terms—philosophy versus science, individual versus social—is used by Goldman and suggest that it is less clear than one would like how these key notions are or could be distinguished from one another. Doubts about these distinctions, at least as Goldman employs them, suggest more general concerns regarding Goldman's style of naturalism and the status of philosophy as a source of knowledge. Liaisons: philosophy meets the cognitive and social sciences , A. Goldman. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Hilary Kornblith (2007). Naturalism and Intuitions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):27-49.
Don Fallis (2005). Epistemic Value Theory and Social Epistemology. Episteme 2 (3):177-188.
Christoph Jäger (2009). Why to Believe Weakly in Weak Knowledge: Goldman on Knowledge as Mere True Belief. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):19-40.
Don Fallis (2002). Goldman on Probabilistic Inference. Philosophical Studies 109 (3):223 - 240.
Alvin I. Goldman (1999). Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford University Press.
Esther-Mirjam Sent (1997). An Economist's Glance at Goldman's Economics. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):148.
Gerhard Schurz, Markus Werning & Alvin I. Goldman (eds.) (2009). Reliable Knowledge and Social Epistemology: Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Goldman and Replies by Goldman. Rodopi.
Alvin Goldman (1992). Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology. In Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences. Cambridge, Mass.: Mit Press. 271-285.
Alvin Goldman (1992). Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences. Cambridge, Mass.: Mit Press.
Added to index2010-05-07
Total downloads5 ( #249,670 of 1,410,302 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #155,456 of 1,410,302 )
How can I increase my downloads?