Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):747-748 (2004)
|Abstract||Atran & Norenzayan (A&N) have not adequately supported the epistemic component of their proposal, namely, that God does not exist. A weaker, more probable hypothesis, not requiring that component – that the benefits of religious belief outweigh those of disbelief, even though we do not know whether or not God exists – is available. I counsel them to use Ockham's razor, eliminate their negative epistemic thesis, and accept the weaker hypothesis.|
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