The Middle Does Not Hold
Journal of Philosophical Research 36:361-369 (2011)
| Abstract | This paper continues the dialogue between my right-wing-Sellars and James O’Shea’s middle-Sellars. In it, I reply to O’Shea’s middle-Sellars critique of my right-wing-Sellarsian criticism of his recent attempt (Wilfrid Sellars: Wilfrid Sellars: Naturalism with a Normative Turn) to develop an understanding of Sellars’s overall view that avoids the problems of both right and left-wing-Sellarsians. In his contribution to this issue O’Shea argues that Sellars follows a middle way between left and right-wing-Sellarsians by advocating a refined Kantian naturalist account of human knowledge. In so doing he finds my right-wing interpretation of Sellars is not true to the real Sellars. Here I show that O’Shea’s critique of my right-wing-Sellars fails and that the real Sellars is a right-wing-Sellars, a scientific naturalist | |||||||||
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William A. Rottschaefer (2011). Why Wilfrid Sellars Is Right (and Right-Wing). Journal of Philosophical Research 36:291-325.
James R. O.’Shea (2011). How to Be a Kantian and a Naturalist About Human Knowledge. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:327-359.
James R. O'Shea (2009). On the Structure of Sellars's Naturalism with a Normative Turn. In Willem A. DeVries (ed.), Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Oxford University Press.
James R. O'Shea (2011). How to Be a Kantian and a Naturalist About Human Knowledge: Sellars’s Middle Way. Journal of Philosophical Research 36 (March):327–59.
James R. O'Shea (2011). ‘How to Be a Kantian and a Naturalist About Human Knowledge: Sellars’s Middle Way’. Journal of Philosophical Research 36 (March):327–59.
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Timm Triplett & Willem A. DeVries (2006). Is Sellars's Rylean Hypothesis Plausible? A Dialogue. In Michael P. Wolf & Mark Norris Lance (eds.), The Self-Correcting Enterprise: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Rodopi.
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