David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 190 (3):563-584 (2013)
Sometimes we get what seem to be good reasons for believing that we’ve misevaluated our evidence for a proposition P. In those cases, can we use our evidence for P itself to show that we haven’t misevaluated our evidence for P? I show why doing so appears to employ viciously circular reasoning. However, I then argue that this appearance is illusory in certain cases and that we sometimes can legitimately reason in that way. This claim sheds new light on the nature of epistemic undermining and epistemic circularity. In addition, it has implications for the current debate about the epistemic significance of disagreement. An important and influential position in that debate says that disagreement with others dramatically undermines our justification for a wide range of our opinions (e.g., political, religious, moral, economic, and philosophical opinions). My view on undermining and circularity implies that this position on disagreement rests on a mistake.
|Keywords||Undermining Defeaters Higher-order evidence Epistemic circularity Easy knowledge Bootstrapping Disagreement Conciliationism Epistemic justification Evidence Epistemology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
David Christensen (2007). Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News. Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Adam Elga (2007). Reflection and Disagreement. Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Michael Huemer (2001). Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.
Richard A. Fumerton (1995). Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Rowman & Littlefield.
Citations of this work BETA
Andrew Rotondo (2015). Disagreement and Intellectual Scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):251-271.
Similar books and articles
Amir Konigsberg (2012). The Problem with Uniform Solutions to Peer Disagreement. Theoria 79 (1):96-126.
Michael Thune (2010). Religious Belief and the Epistemology of Disagreement. Philosophy Compass 5 (8):712-724.
Richard Feldman (2009). Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement. Episteme 6 (3):294-312.
Andrew D. Cling (2002). Justification-Affording Circular Arguments. Philosophical Studies 111 (3):251 - 275.
Jonathan Matheson (2009). Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence. Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 6 (3):269-279.
Sanford C. Goldberg (2013). Inclusiveness in the Face of Anticipated Disagreement. Synthese 190 (7):1189-1207.
David Killoren (2010). Moral Intuitions, Reliability and Disagreement. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (1):1-35.
Axel Gelfert (2011). Who is an Epistemic Peer? Logos and Episteme 2 (4):507-514.
Robin McKenna (2012). Epistemic Contextualism, Epistemic Relativism and Disagreement. Philosophical Writings.
Ralph Wedgwood (2010). The Moral Evil Demons. In Richard Feldman & Ted Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford University Press
Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder (2013). Reversibility or Disagreement. Mind 122 (485):43-84.
Bryan Frances (2010). The Reflective Epistemic Renegade. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):419 - 463.
Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes (2014). Disagreement Without Error. Erkenntnis 79 (1):143-154.
Added to index2011-12-18
Total downloads107 ( #28,100 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #99,332 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?