Verbal behaviorism and theoretical mentalism: An assessment of Marras-Sellars dialogue

Philosophy Research Archives 9:511-534 (1983)
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Abstract

Sellars’ verbal behaviorism demands that linguistic episodes be conceptual in an underivative sense and his theoretical mentalism that thoughts as postulated theoretical entities be modelled on linguistic behaviors. Marras has contended that Sellars’ own methodology requires that semantic categories be theoretical. Thus linguistic behaviors can be conceptual in only a derivative sense. Further he claims that overt linguistic behaviors cannot serve as a model for all thought because thought is primarily symbolic. I support verbal behaviorism by showing that semantic categories are in the first instance teleological explanatory categories and consequently can be observational. And I show how theoretical mentalism can be maintained even though thought is primarily symbolic

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William A. Rottschaefer
Boston University (PhD)

Citations of this work

Wilfrid Sellars.Willem deVries - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Wilfrid Sellars.Jay Rosenberg - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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