Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 162 (3):637-643 (2013)
|Abstract||Many epistemologists treat knowledge as a binary relation that holds between a subject and a proposition. The contrastive account of knowledge developed by Jonathan Schaffer maintains that knowledge is a ternary, contrastive relation that holds between a subject, a proposition, and a set of contextually salient alternative propositions the subject’s evidence must eliminate. For the contrastivist, it is never simply the case that S knows that p; in every case of knowledge S knows that p rather than q. This paper offers a counterexample to the contrastive account of knowledge. Part 1 summarizes the contrastive theory developed by Schaffer in a series of recent papers. Part 2 presents an example from a class of cases characterized by compatibility between the proposition p and each of the alternative propositions that occupy q. In such cases the alternative propositions that partially constitute the ternary contrastive relation play no role in the acquisition of knowledge. Part 3 considers and rejects potential responses to the counterexample. The paper concludes that the contrastive theory is not a general account of knowledge|
|Keywords||Epistemology Knowledge Contrastivism Schaffer|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ren (2008). The Knowledge Relation: Binary or Ternary? Social Epistemology 22 (3):281 – 288.
Rene van Woudenberg (2008). The Knowledge Relation: Binary or Ternary? Social Epistemology 22 (3):281-288.
Antti Karjalainen & Adam Morton (2003). Contrastive Knowledge. Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):74 – 89.
Joel Buenting (2010). An Epistemic Reduction of Contrastive Knowledge Claims. Social Epistemology 24 (2):99-104.
Jonathan Schaffer (2008). The Contrast-Sensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions. Social Epistemology 22 (3):235-245.
Jonathan Schaffer (2005). Contrastive Knowledge. In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1. Oxford University Press.
Peter Baumann (2008). Contrastivism Rather Than Something Else? On the Limits of Epistemic Contrastivism. Erkenntnis 69 (2):189 - 200.
Jonathan Schaffer (forthcoming). Contrastive Knowledge: Reply to Baumann. In Stefan Tolksdorf (ed.), The Concept of Knowledge. Walter de Gruyter.
Jonathan Schaffer (2007). Closure, Contrast, and Answer. Philosophical Studies 133 (2):233–255.
Maria Aloni & Paul Égré (2010). Alternative Questions and Knowledge Attributions. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):1-27.
Ram Neta (2008). Undermining the Case for Contrastivism. Social Epistemology 22 (3):289 – 304.
Jonathan Schaffer (2005). Contrastive Causation. Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358.
Rafał Palczewski (2009). Kontrastywizm epistemiczny. Filozofia Nauki 4.
Branden Fitelson (2012). Contrastive Bayesianism. In Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in Philosophy: New Perspectives. Routledge.
Antti Karjalainen & Adam Morton (2008). Contrastivity and Indistinguishability. Social Epistemology 22 (3):271-280.
Added to index2011-08-12
Total downloads56 ( #21,451 of 740,358 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #26,535 of 740,358 )
How can I increase my downloads?