Arguing for the Natural Ontological Attitude

Abstract
Arthur Fine has recently argued that standard realist and anti-realist interpretations of science should be replaced by "natural ontological attitude" (NOA). I ask whether Fine's own justification for NOA can meet the standards of argument that underlie his criticisms of realism and anti-realism. Fine vacillates between two different ways of advocating NOA. The more minimalist defense ("why not try NOA?") begs the question against both realists and antirealists. A stronger program, based on Fine's arguments for a "no-theory" of truth, has promise, but the arguments must be developed in a stronger, more general form if they are to justify NOA.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,360
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Sharon L. Crasnow (2000). How Natural Can Ontology Be? Philosophy of Science 67 (1):114-132.
    Sami Pihlström (1996). Getting Ontologically Natural. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (3):247-256.
    Myron A. Penner (2002). The Quest for Natural Attitudes Within Ontological Limits. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 76:103-116.
    Arthur I. Fine (1984). The Natural Ontological Attitude. In J. Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism. University of California Press. 261--77.
    David J. Chalmers (2009). Ontological Anti-Realism. In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press.
    William Newton-Smith (1988). Modest Realism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:179 - 189.
    Alan Musgrave (1989). Noa's Ark--Fine for Realism. Philosophical Quarterly 39 (157):383-398.
    Jamin Asay (2013). Three Paradigms of Scientific Realism: A Truthmaking Account. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):1-21.
    Soazig Le Bihan (2009). Fine's Ways to Fail to Secure Local Realism. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 40 (2):142-150.
    Arthur Fine (1991). Piecemeal Realism. Philosophical Studies 61 (1-2):79 - 96.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2011-05-29

    Total downloads

    13 ( #100,575 of 1,089,047 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,722 of 1,089,047 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.