Graduate studies at Western
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:294 - 301 (1988)
|Abstract||Arthur Fine has recently argued that standard realist and anti-realist interpretations of science should be replaced by "natural ontological attitude" (NOA). I ask whether Fine's own justification for NOA can meet the standards of argument that underlie his criticisms of realism and anti-realism. Fine vacillates between two different ways of advocating NOA. The more minimalist defense ("why not try NOA?") begs the question against both realists and antirealists. A stronger program, based on Fine's arguments for a "no-theory" of truth, has promise, but the arguments must be developed in a stronger, more general form if they are to justify NOA.|
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