I. the durability of impossible objects
Inquiry 19 (1-4):247 – 251 (1976)
| Abstract | Meinong's theory of impossible objects is defended against a number of objections, in particular against Karel Lambert's argument (see Impossible Objects?, Inquiry, Vol. 17 [1974], pp. 303?14) that no objects are impossible | |||||||||
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Karel Lambert (1976). II. On 'the Durability of Impossible Objects'1. Inquiry 19 (1-4):251-253.
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