Necessary limits to knowledge: Unknowable truths

Synthese 173 (1):107 - 122 (2010)
The paper seeks a perfectly general argument regarding the non-contingent limits to any (human or non-human) knowledge. After expressing disappointment with the history of philosophy on this score, an argument is grounded in Fitch’s proof, which demonstrates the unknowability of some truths. The necessity of this unknowability is then defended by arguing for the necessity of Fitch’s premise—viz., there this is in fact some ignorance.
Keywords Knowability  Fitch’s paradox  Verificationism
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P. F. Strawson (1967). The Bounds of Sense. Philosophy 42 (162):379-382.

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