David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Christoph Lumer & Sandro Nannini (eds.), Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy. Ashgate (2007)
The ‘doctrine of double effect’ claims that it is in some sense morally less problematic to bring about a negatively evaluated state of affairs as a ‘side effect’ of one’s pursuit of another, morally unobjectionable aim than it is to bring it about in order to achieve that aim. In a first step, this chapter discusses the descriptive difference on which the claim is built. That difference is shown to derive from the attitudinal distinction between intention and ‘acceptance’, a distinction that is in turn claimed to ground in a feature of the decisions that generate the attitudes in question. The resulting analysis is then plugged into two different normative principles that may each be thought to specify the intuitions behind the doctrine of double effect, but which have frequently been conflated. The first concerns the permissibility of bringing about the merely accepted state of affairs, the second its reduced attributability. It is argued that examination of the intuitions behind the two principles supports neither version of the doctrine. Rather, the intuitions are best captured in an attribution principle based on subjective probabilities and a principle of attitude evaluation, neither of which make explicit reference to the attitude of intending.
|Keywords||double effect intention normative ethics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
David K. Chan (2000). Intention and Responsibility in Double Effect Cases. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (4):405-434.
Joseph Boyle (1991). Who is Entitled to Double Effect? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16 (5):475-494.
Lawrence Masek (2010). Intentions, Motives and the Doctrine of Double Effect. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):567-585.
Lawrence Masek (2011). The Contralife Argument and the Principle of Double Effect. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11 (1):83-97.
Donald B. Marquis (1991). Four Versions of Double Effect. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16 (5):515-544.
Neil Francis Delaney (2008). Two Cheers for “Closeness”: Terror, Targeting and Double Effect. Philosophical Studies 137 (3):335 - 367.
Iii Get Checked Abstract Thomas J. Bole (1991). The Theoretical Tenability of the Doctrine of Double Effect. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16 (5).
Whitley R. P. Kaufman (2009). The Paradox of Self-Defense: Saving Oneself by Harming Another. Lexington Books.
Steven Lee (2004). Double Effect, Double Intention, and Asymmetric Warfare. Journal of Military Ethics 3 (3):233-251.
Alexander R. Pruss (2013). The Accomplishment of Plans: A New Version of the Principle of Double Effect. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 165 (1):49-69.
Alison Hills (2007). Intentions, Foreseen Consequences and the Doctrine of Double Effect. Philosophical Studies 133 (2):257 - 283.
Ezio Di Nucci (2013). Double Effect and Terror Bombing. In T. Spitzley, M. Hoeltje & W. Spohn (eds.), GAP.8 Proceedings. GAP.
Neil Levy (2011). Neuroethics: A New Way of Doing Ethics. AJOB Neuroscience 2 (2):3-9.
Ezio Di Nucci (2013). Embryo Loss and Double Effect. Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (8):537-540.
Added to index2011-04-16
Total downloads64 ( #19,268 of 1,089,104 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #24,289 of 1,089,104 )
How can I increase my downloads?