Synthese 177 (1):139-149 (2010)
|Abstract||This paper argues that Duhem’s thesis does not decisively refute a corroboration-based account of scientific methodology (or ‘falsificationism’), but instead that auxiliary hypotheses are themselves subject to measurements of corroboration which can be used to inform practice. It argues that a corroboration-based account is equal to the popular Bayesian alternative, which has received much more recent attention, in this respect.|
|Keywords||Corroboration Falsificationism Duhem's Thesis Quine-Duhem Thesis Confirmation Popper|
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