David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Topoi 28 (1):53-62 (2009)
According to the view that has become known as the extended mind , some token mental processes extend into the cognizing organism’s environment in that they are composed (partly) of manipulative, exploitative, and transformative operations performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. Enactivist models understand mental processes as (partly) constituted by sensorimotor knowledge and by the organism’s ability to act, in appropriate ways, on environmental structures. Given the obvious similarities between the two views, it is both tempting and common to regard them as essentially variations on the same theme. In this paper, I shall argue that the similarities between enactivist and extended models of cognition are relatively superficial, and the divergences are deeper than commonly thought.
|Keywords||Ability Enactivism Extended mind Sensorimotor knowledge|
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References found in this work BETA
Evan Thompson (2007). Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. Harvard University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Nigel Stepp, Anthony Chemero & Michael T. Turvey (2011). Philosophy for the Rest of Cognitive Science. Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):425-437.
Sven Walter (2010). Locked-in Syndrome, Bci, and a Confusion About Embodied, Embedded, Extended, and Enacted Cognition. Neuroethics 3 (1):61-72.
Xabier E. Barandiaran (forthcoming). Autonomy and Enactivism: Towards a Theory of Sensorimotor Autonomous Agency. Topoi:1-22.
Michael D. Kirchhoff (2015). Extended Cognition & the Causal‐Constitutive Fallacy: In Search for a Diachronic and Dynamical Conception of Constitution. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):320-360.
Hamid Vahid (2014). Cognitive Penetration, the Downgrade Principle, and Extended Cognition. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):439-459.
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