Group Level Interpretations of Probability: New Directions

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):188-203 (2013)
In this article, I present some new group level interpretations of probability, and champion one in particular: a consensus-based variant where group degrees of belief are construed as agreed upon betting quotients rather than shared personal degrees of belief. One notable feature of the account is that it allows us to treat consensus between experts on some matter as being on the union of their relevant background information. In the course of the discussion, I also introduce a novel distinction between intersubjective and interobjective interpretations of probability.
Keywords Intersubjective Probability  Interobjective Probability  Degrees of Belief  Betting behaviour  Group rationality  Consensus
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01451.x
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