David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):188-203 (2013)
In this article, I present some new group level interpretations of probability, and champion one in particular: a consensus-based variant where group degrees of belief are construed as agreed upon betting quotients rather than shared personal degrees of belief. One notable feature of the account is that it allows us to treat consensus between experts on some matter as being on the union of their relevant background information. In the course of the discussion, I also introduce a novel distinction between intersubjective and interobjective interpretations of probability
|Keywords||Intersubjective Probability Interobjective Probability Degrees of Belief Betting behaviour Group rationality Consensus|
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References found in this work BETA
Philip Kitcher (1993). The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions. Oxford University Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
Rudolf Carnap (1962). Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann (2003). Bayesian Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry (2013). Prove It! The Burden of Proof Game in Science Vs. Pseudoscience Disputes. Philosophia 42 (2):487-502.
Matthew Kopec (2015). A New Group Dutch Book Argument. Ratio 28 (4).
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