David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):124-132 (2008)
How are we to understand the use of probability in corroboration functions? Popper says logically, but does not show we could have access to, or even calculate, probability values in a logical sense. This makes the logical interpretation untenable, as Ramsey and van Fraassen have argued. -/- If corroboration functions only make sense when the probabilities employed therein are subjective, however, then what counts as impressive evidence for a theory might be a matter of convention, or even whim. So isn’t so-called ‘corroboration’ just a matter of psychology? -/- In this paper, I argue that we can go some way towards addressing this objection by adopting an intersubjective interpretation, of the form advocated by Gillies, with respect to corroboration. I show why intersubjective probabilities are preferable to subjective ones when it comes to decision making in science: why group decisions are liable to be superior to individual ones, given a number of plausible conditions. I then argue that intersubjective corroboration is preferable to intersubjective confirmation of a Bayesian variety, because there is greater opportunity for principled agreement concerning the factors involved in the former.
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References found in this work BETA
F. P. Ramsey (2010). Truth and Probability. In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge 52-94.
Alan Hájek (2003). What Conditional Probability Could Not Be. Synthese 137 (3):273--323.
Robert N. Audi (1994). Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe. Noûs 28 (4):419-34.
E. G. Zahar (1995). The Problem of the Empirical Basis. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 39:45-74.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2005). The Empirical Stance Vs. The Critical Attitude. South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):200-223.
Citations of this work BETA
Matthew Kopec (2015). A New Group Dutch Book Argument. Ratio 28 (4).
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2010). Evolutionary Epistemology and the Aim of Science. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):209-225.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2011). Stances and Paradigms: A Reflection. Synthese 178 (1):111-119.
Darrell P. Rowbottom & R. McNeill Alexander (2012). The Role of Hypotheses in Biomechanical Research. Science in Context 25 (2):247-262.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2013). Group Level Interpretations of Probability: New Directions. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):188-203.
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