In Defence of Popper On the Logical Possibility of Universal Laws: A Reply to Contessa
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
This paper is a critique of Contessa’s (in the same issue). First, I show that Popper in The Logic of Scientific Discovery argues against the view that the logical probability of a hypothesis is identical to its degree of confirmation (or corroboration), rather than against Bayesianism. Second, I explain that his argument to this effect does not depend on the assumption that ‘the universe is infinite’. Third, and finally, I refine Popper’s case by developing an argument which requires only that some universal laws have a logical probability of zero relative to any finite evidence, and providing an example concerning Newtonian mechanics.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2008). Intersubjective Corroboration. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):124-132.
Similar books and articles
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2013). Popper's Measure of Corroboration and P(H|B). British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):axs029.
Theo A. F. Kuipers (2005). A Brand New Type of Inductive Logic: Reply to Diderik Batens. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):248-252.
Danilo Šuster (2005). Popper on Laws and Counterfactuals. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):109-119.
Peter Schroeder-Heister (1984). Popper's Theory of Deductive Inference and the Concept of a Logical Constant. History and Philosophy of Logic 5 (1):79-110.
Hugues Leblanc & Peter Roeper (1993). Getting the Constraints on Popper's Probability Functions Right. Philosophy of Science 60 (1):151-157.
R. A. Sharpe (1964). The Logical Status of Natural Laws. Inquiry 7 (1-4):414-416.
Theo A. F. Kuipers (1973). A Generalization of Carnap's Inductive Logic. Synthese 25 (3-4):334 - 336.
Theo A. F. Kuipers (1986). Some Estimates of the Optimum Inductive Method. Erkenntnis 24 (1):37 - 46.
Theo A. F. Kuipers (1984). Two Types of Inductive Analogy by Similarity. Erkenntnis 21 (1):63 - 87.
Theo A. F. Kuipers (1983). Non-Inductive Explication of Two Inductive Intuitions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (3):209-223.
Victor Rodych (2003). Popper Versus Wittgenstein on Truth, Necessity, and Scientific Hypotheses. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 34 (2):323-336.
Joseph Diekemper (2005). Logical Determinateness, Fixity, and the Symmetry of Time. Philosophical Papers 34 (1):1-24.
David N. Stamos (2007). Popper, Laws, and the Exclusion of Biology From Genuine Science. Acta Biotheoretica 55 (4).
Remmel T. Nunn (1979). I. Psychologism, Functionalism, and the Modal Status of Logical Laws. Inquiry 22 (1-4):343-349.
Chris Mortensen & Tim Burgess (1989). On Logical Strength and Weakness. History and Philosophy of Logic 10 (1):47-51.
Added to index2010-12-22
Total downloads3 ( #307,951 of 1,101,857 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?