Information Versus Knowledge in Confirmation Theory

Logique Et Analyse (forthcoming)
Abstract I argue that so-called 'background knowledge' in confirmation theory has little, if anything, to do with 'knowledge' in the sense of mainstream epistemology. I argue that it is better construed as 'background information', which need not be believed in, justified, or true.
Keywords Knowledge  Information  Confirmation
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    Franz Huber (2005). What Is the Point of Confirmation? Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1146-1159.

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