N-rays and the semantic view of scientific progress
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):277-278 (2008)
| Abstract | This paper challenges a recent argument of Bird’s, which involves imagining that Réné Blondlot’s belief in N-rays was true, in favour of the view that scientific progress should be understood in terms of knowledge rather than truth. By considering several variants of Bird’s thought-experiment, it shows that the semantic account of progress cannot be so easily vanquished. A key possibility is that justification is only instrumental in, and not partly constitutive of, progress. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,679 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Atocha Aliseda (2005). Lacunae, Empirical Progress and Semantic Tableaux. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):169-189.
Demetris P. Portides (2005). Scientific Models and the Semantic View of Scientific Theories. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1287-1298.
Jonathan Y. Tsou (2006). Genetic Epistemology and Piaget's Philosophy of Science: Piaget Vs. Kuhn on Scientific Progress. Theory and Psychology 16 (2):203-224.
Hans Halvorson (2012). What Scientific Theories Could Not Be. Philosophy of Science 79 (2):183-206.
Paul M. Quay (1974). Progress as a Demarcation Criterion for the Sciences. Philosophy of Science 41 (2):154-170.
Alexander Bird (2007). What is Scientific Progress? Noûs 41 (1):64–89.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2010). What Scientific Progress Is Not: Against Bird's Epistemic View. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (3):241-255.
Alexander Bird (2008). Scientific Progress as Accumulation of Knowledge: A Reply to Rowbottom. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):279-281.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads27 ( #45,781 of 549,084 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,317 of 549,084 )How can I increase my downloads? |

