N-rays and the semantic view of scientific progress

This paper challenges a recent argument of Bird’s, which involves imagining that Réné Blondlot’s belief in N-rays was true, in favour of the view that scientific progress should be understood in terms of knowledge rather than truth. By considering several variants of Bird’s thought-experiment, it shows that the semantic account of progress cannot be so easily vanquished. A key possibility is that justification is only instrumental in, and not partly constitutive of, progress.
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DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.03.010
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Clark (1963). Knowledge and Grounds: A Comment on Mr. Gettier's Paper. (Repr. In Bobbs-Merrill Reprint Series; Gendin and Hoffman, Eds., Introduction to Philosophy, 1973; Lucey, Ed., On Knowing and the Known, 1996; Huemer, Ed., The Epistemology Reader, 2002) Analysis 24 (2):46 - 48.
Ward E. Jones (1997). Why Do We Value Knowledge? American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):423 - 439.
Earl Conee (1992). The Truth Connection. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):657-669.

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Citations of this work BETA
Moti Mizrahi (2013). What is Scientific Progress? Lessons From Scientific Practice. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (2):375-390.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2010). What Scientific Progress Is Not: Against Bird's Epistemic View. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (3):241-255.

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