David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 69 (3):335-349 (2008)
In his Bayesian Nets and Causality, Jon Williamson presents an ‘Objective Bayesian’ interpretation of probability, which he endeavours to distance from the logical interpretation yet associate with the subjective interpretation. In doing so, he suggests that the logical interpretation suffers from severe epistemological problems that do not affect his alternative. In this paper, I present a challenge to his analysis. First, I closely examine the relationship between the logical and ‘Objective Bayesian’ views, and show how, and why, they are highly similar. Second, I argue that the logical interpretation is not manifestly inferior, at least for the reasons that Williamson offers. I suggest that the key difference between the logical and ‘Objective Bayesian’ views is in the domain of the philosophy of logic; and that the genuine disagreement appears to be over Platonism versus nominalism (within weak psychologism).
|Keywords||Philosophy Logic Ethics Ontology Epistemology Philosophy|
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References found in this work BETA
John Locke (1995). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford University Press.
Rudolf Carnap (1962). Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
Ian Hacking (1995). The Emergence of Probability. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
John Maynard Keynes (1921). A Treatise on Probability. Dover Publications.
Citations of this work BETA
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2010). Evolutionary Epistemology and the Aim of Science. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):209-225.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2013). Group Level Interpretations of Probability: New Directions. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):188-203.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2010). Corroboration and Auxiliary Hypotheses: Duhem’s Thesis Revisited. Synthese 177 (1):139-149.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2010). Corroboration and Auxiliary Hypotheses: Duhem's Thesis Revisited. Synthese 177 (1):139-149.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2012). Objective Bayesianism Defended? Metascience 21 (1):193-196.
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Gregory Wheeler & Jon Williamson (2011). Evidential Probability and Objective Bayesian Epistemology. In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Statistics. Elsevier
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