Permissibility and violable rules

Philosophia 36 (3):367-374 (2008)
From a logical point of view, permissibility can be reduced to possibility by introducing demands which can be met. The alleged reduction is circular from a philosophical perspective, however, because demands are fundamentally deontic. This paper solves this problem by replacing demands which can be met with rules which can be satisfied and violated.
Keywords Deontic logic  Modal logic  Permissibility  Rules
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-007-9113-5
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References found in this work BETA
John Rawls (1955). Two Concepts of Rules. Philosophical Review 64 (1):3-32.
Kit Fine (2002). Varieties of Necessity. In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford Up 253-281.
Arthur N. Prior (1962). Formal Logic. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Paul McNamara, Deontic Logic. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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