David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):131-137 (2007)
Schwitzgebel (2001) — henceforth 'S' — offers three examples in order to convince us that there are situations in which individuals are neither accurately describable as believing that p or failing to so believe, but are rather in 'in-between states of belief'. He then argues that there are no 'Bayesian' or representational strategies for explicating these, and proposes a dispositional account. I do not have any fundamental objection to the idea that there might be 'in-between states of belief'. What I shall argue, rather, is that: (I) S does not provide a convincing argument that there really are such states; (II) S does not show, as he claims, that 'in-between states of belief' could not be accounted for in terms of degrees of belief; (III) S’s dispositional account of 'in-between states of belief' is more problematic than the 'degree of belief' alternative.
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Citations of this work BETA
Eric Schwitzgebel (2010). Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs or the Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.
Michael Brownstein & Alex Madva (2012). The Normativity of Automaticity. Mind and Language 27 (4):410-434.
Cristina Borgoni (2016). Dissonance and Irrationality: A Criticism of The In‐Between Account of Dissonance Cases. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):48-57.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2013). Group Level Interpretations of Probability: New Directions. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):188-203.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2012). Objective Bayesianism Defended? Metascience 21 (1):193-196.
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