Rescuing Companions in Guilt Arguments

Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):161–171 (2016)
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Abstract

Christopher Cowie has recently argued that companions in guilt arguments against the moral error theory that appeal to epistemic reasons cannot work. I show that such companions in guilt arguments can work if, as we have good reason to believe, moral reasons and epistemic reasons are instances of fundamentally the same relation.

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10.1093/pq/pqv070

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Rach Cosker-Rowland
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Conceptions of Epistemic Value.Timothy Perrine - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):213-231.
Pain for the Moral Error Theory? A New Companions-in-Guilt Argument.Guy Fletcher - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):474-482.
On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):77-96.

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References found in this work

The Indispensability of Mathematics.Mark Colyvan - 2001 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
The normative web: an argument for moral realism.Terence Cuneo - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Reasons as Evidence.Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42.
Quantitative parsimony.Daniel Nolan - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):329-343.
Moral Error Theory and the Argument from Epistemic Reasons.Richard Rowland - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1):1-24.

View all 10 references / Add more references