Representing Without Representations

There is a problem of representation and an apparatus of representations that was devised to solve this problem. This paper has two purposes. First, it will show why the problem of representation outstrips the apparatus of representations in the sense that the problem survives the demise of the apparatus. Secondly, it will argue that the question of whether cognition does or not involve representations is a poorly defined question, and far too crude to be helpful in understanding the nature of cognitive processes
Keywords action  normativity  representation  cognition  intentionality
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