David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1200-1211 (2011)
This paper develops a new version of instrumentalism, in light of progress in the realism debate in recent decades, and thereby defends the view that instrumentalism remains a viable philosophical position on science. The key idea is that talk of unobservable objects should be taken literally only when those objects are assigned properties (or described in terms of analogies involving things) with which we are experientially (or otherwise) acquainted. This is derivative from the instrumentalist tradition in so far as the distinction between unobservable and observable is taken to have significance with respect to meaning.
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Citations of this work BETA
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2013). Empirical Evidence Claims Are a Priori. Synthese 190 (14):2821-2834.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2012). Identification in Games: Changing Places. Erkenntnis 77 (2):197-206.
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