David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Studia Logica 87 (1):65 - 71 (2007)
It is a common view that the axioms of probability can be derived from the following assumptions: (a) probabilities reflect (rational) degrees of belief, (b) degrees of belief can be measured as betting quotients; and (c) a rational agent must select betting quotients that are coherent. In this paper, I argue that a consideration of reasonable betting behaviour, with respect to the alleged derivation of the first axiom of probability, suggests that (b) and (c) are incorrect. In particular, I show how a rational agent might assign a ‘probability’ of zero to an event which she is sure will occur.
|Keywords||Philosophy Computational Linguistics Mathematical Logic and Foundations Logic|
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Jon Williamson (2011). Objective Bayesianism, Bayesian Conditionalisation and Voluntarism. Synthese 178 (1):67-85.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2008). On the Proximity of the Logical and 'Objective Bayesian' Interpretations of Probability. Erkenntnis 69 (3):335-349.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2012). Objective Bayesianism Defended? Metascience 21 (1):193-196.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2008). Intersubjective Corroboration. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):124-132.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2013). Group Level Interpretations of Probability: New Directions. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):188-203.
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