Studia Logica 87 (1):65 - 71 (2007)
|Abstract||It is a common view that the axioms of probability can be derived from the following assumptions: (a) probabilities reflect (rational) degrees of belief, (b) degrees of belief can be measured as betting quotients; and (c) a rational agent must select betting quotients that are coherent. In this paper, I argue that a consideration of reasonable betting behaviour, with respect to the alleged derivation of the first axiom of probability, suggests that (b) and (c) are incorrect. In particular, I show how a rational agent might assign a ‘probability’ of zero to an event which she is sure will occur.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Brad Armendt (1980). Is There a Dutch Book Argument for Probability Kinematics? Philosophy of Science 47 (4):583-588.
Paul Bartha (2004). Countable Additivity and the de Finetti Lottery. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):301-321.
Brian Weatherson (2003). From Classical to Intuitionistic Probability. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (2):111-123.
Wei Xiong (2011). Implications of the Dutch Book: Following Ramsey's Axioms. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (2):334-344.
Robert Titiev (1997). Arbitrage and the Dutch Book Theorem. Journal of Philosophical Research 22:477-482.
Colin Howson (1989). Subjective Probabilities and Betting Quotients. Synthese 81 (1):1 - 8.
C. Waidacher (1997). Hidden Assumptions in the Dutch Book Argument. Theory and Decision 43 (3):293-312.
T. Seidenfeld, M. J. Schervish & J. B. Kadane (1990). When Fair Betting Odds Are Not Degrees of Belief. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:517 - 524.
Peter Milne (1990). Scotching the Dutch Book Argument. Erkenntnis 32 (1):105--26.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads22 ( #62,658 of 722,774 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,541 of 722,774 )
How can I increase my downloads?