Peach trees, gravity and God: Mechanism in Locke
British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (3):387 – 412 (2004)
| Abstract | Locke claimed that God superadded various powers to matter, including motion, the perfections of peach trees and elephants, gravity, and that he could superadd thought. Various interpreters have discussed the question whether Locke's claims about superaddition are in tension with his commitment to mechanistic explanation. This literature assumes that for Locke mechanistic explanation involves deducibility. We argue that this is an inaccurate interpretation and that mechanistic explanation involves a different type of intelligibility for Locke. | |||||||||
| Keywords | superaddition corpuscularianism thinking matter | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Gabriel Infante-Lopez & Maarten De Rijke (2006). A Note on the Expressive Power of Probabilistic Context Free Grammars. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (3).
Chris Smeenk (2006). The Elusive Higgs Mechanism. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):487-499.
Struan Jacobs & Allan McNeish (1997). Locke, McCann, and Voluntarism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (4):349–362.
Gideon Yaffe (2007). Locke on Ideas of Identity and Diversity. In Lex Newman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding". Cambridge University Press.
Andrew Janiak (2007). Newton and the Reality of Force. Journal of the History of Philosophy 45 (1):127-147.
M. R. Ayers (1981). Mechanism, Superaddition, and the Proof of God's Existence in Locke's Essay. Philosophical Review 90 (2):210-251.
Stewart Duncan (2005). Knowledge of God in Leviathan. History of Philosophy Quarterly 22 (1):31-48.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads12 ( #93,408 of 549,117 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,361 of 549,117 )How can I increase my downloads? |

