David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):175-203 (1994)
materialist that beliefs are not immaterial soul-states, I think that the conception of beliefs as brain states is badly misguided. I hope to show that "beliefs are brain states or soul states" is a false dichotomy. I am using the phrase 'beliefs as brain states' to cover several familiar theses: the token-identity thesis, according to which beliefs are identical to brain-state tokens; nonreductive materialism, according to which beliefs are constituted by brain states (as pebbles are constituted by..
|Keywords||Attitude Belief Cartesianism Causation Epistemology|
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Lynne Rudder Baker (1999). What is This Thing Called 'Commonsense Psychology'? Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):3-19.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2011). First-Personal Aspects of Agency. Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):1-16.
Greg Janzen (2008). Bennett and Hacker on Neural Materialism. Acta Analytica 23 (3):273-286.
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