David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 48 (5):413-435 (2005)
This paper starts from the debate between proponents of a neo-Lockean psychological continuity view of personal identity, and defenders of the idea that we are simple mental substances. Each party has valid criticisms of the other; the impasse in the debate is traced to the Lockean assumption that substance is only externally related to its attributes. This suggests the possibility that we could develop a better account of mental substance if we thought of it as having an internal relation to its states. I suggest that we may be able to do this by relying on the notion of expression. In developing this idea I draw heavily on aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology, while also developing and criticizing Strawson's account of persons and recent work by Lynne Baker. I conclude by arguing that mental substance, understood in this way, can only be grasped in narrative terms; substantialist and narrative accounts of personal identity, far from being opposed, are mutually supporting and require one another to be coherent
|Keywords||Consciousness Expression Metaphysics Mind Narrative Baker, Lynne Rudder Strawson, Peter Frederick|
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Citations of this work BETA
Melvin Chen (2015). Apologia Pro Vita-Fabula Sua: Defending Narrativity and How We Make Sense of Our Lives. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (3):251-268.
Patrick Stokes (2012). Is Narrative Identity Four-Dimensionalist? European Journal of Philosophy 20 (S1):e86-e106.
Jeanine Weekes Schroer & Robert Schroer (2014). Getting the Story Right: A Reductionist Narrative Account of Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies (3):1-25.
Patrick Stokes (2008). Locke, Kierkegaard and the Phenomenology of Personal Identity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (5):645 – 672.
Patrick Stokes (2012). Ghosts in the Machine: Do the Dead Live on in Facebook? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Technology 25 (3):363-379.
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