David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (4):327-348 (1998)
Self-consciousness, many philosophers agree, is essential to being a person. There is not so much agreement, however, about how to understand what self-consciousness is. Philosophers in the field of cognitive science tend to write off self-consciousness as unproblematic. According to such philosophers, the real difficulty for the cognitive scientist is phenomenal consciousness--the fact that we (and other organisms) have states that feel a certain way. If we had a grip on phenomenal consciousness, they think, self-consciousness could be easily handled by functionalist models. For example, recently Ned Block commented,
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Kristina Musholt (2013). Self-Consciousness and Nonconceptual Content. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):649-672.
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Kristie Miller (2010). Persons as Sui Generis Ontological Kinds: Advice to Exceptionists. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):567-593.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2006). Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism. Noûs 40 (2):307–330.
Tobias Schlicht, Anne Springer, Kirsten G. Volz, Gottfried Vosgerau, Martin Schmidt-Daffy, Daniela Simon & Alexandra Zinck (2009). Self as Cultural Construct? An Argument for Levels of Self-Representations. Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):687 – 709.
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