Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Click here to configure this browser for off-campus access.
- Anthony Rudd (2006). Unnatural Feelings: A Non-Naturalistic Perspective on the Emotions. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.
Similar books and articles
The binary divide between traditional cognitivist and enactivist paradigms is tied to their respective commitments to understanding cognition as based on knowing that as opposed to knowing how. Using O’Regan’s and No¨e’s landmark sensorimotor contingency theory of perceptual experience as a foil, I demonstrate how easy it is to fall into conservative thinking. Although their account is advertised as decidedly ‘skill-based’, on close inspection it shows itself to be riddled with suppositions threatening to reduce it to a rules-and-representations approach. To remain properly enactivist it must be purged of such commitments and indeed all commitment to mediating knowledge: it must embrace a more radical enactivism.
This collection is a much-needed remedy to the confusion about which varieties of enactivism are robust yet viable rejections of traditional representionalism...
Discussion of Anthony Rudd, Unnatural feelings: A non-naturalistic perspective on the emotions
|
|
There are no threads in this forum |
Nothing in this forum yet.

