Why computers can't act

American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (April):157-163 (1981)
To be an agent, one must be able to formulate intentions. To be able to formulate intentions, one must have a first-person perspective. Computers lack a first-person perspective. So, computers are not agents.
Keywords Agency  Computer  I  Metaphysics  Self-consciousness
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