David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):3-19 (1999)
What is this thing called ‘Commonsense Psychology’? The first matter to settle is what the issue is here. By ‘commonsense psychology,’ I mean primarily the systems of describing, explaining and predicting human thought and action in terms of beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, expectations, intentions and other so-called propositional attitudes. Although commonsense psychology encompasses more than propositional attitudes--e.g., emotions, traits and abilities are also within its purview--belief-desire reasoning forms the core of commonsense psychology. Commonsense psychology is what we use to explain intentional action as ordinarily described--e.g., Jack went to the store because he wanted some ice cream. Commonsense psychology also is used to explain mental states--e.g., Jill feared that she would be late because she thought that the meeting began at 4:00. Commonsense psychology is the province of everyone; we all use it all the time
|Keywords||Belief Common Sense Psychology Science Churchland, P|
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Paul M. Churchland (1979). Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Daniel D. Hutto (2004). The Limits of Spectatorial Folk Psychology. Mind and Language 19 (5):548-73.
Matthew Ratcliffe (2006). "Folk Psychology" is Not Folk Psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):31-52.
Karsten R. Stueber (2005). Mental Causation and the Paradoxes of Explanation. Philosophical Studies 122 (3):243-77.
Frank Jackson (2000). Psychological Explanation and Implicit Theory. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):83-95.
Frank Jackson (2000). Hornsby and Baker on the Physicalist Orthodoxy. Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):188-192.
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