Johnny's So Long at the Ferromagnet

Philosophy of Science 73 (5):473-486 (2006)
Starting from the standard quantum formalism for a single spin 1/2 system (e.g., an electron), this essay develops a model rich enough not only to afford an explication of symmetry breaking but also to frame questions about how to circumscribe physical possibility on behalf of theories that countenance symmetry breaking.
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DOI 10.1086/518319
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References found in this work BETA
Daniel W. Aristotle & Graham (1999). Physics. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).

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Citations of this work BETA
David Baker (2009). Against Field Interpretations of Quantum Field Theory. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):585-609.
Holger Lyre (2008). Does the Higgs Mechanism Exist? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (2):119-133.
David John Baker & Hans Halvorson (2013). How is Spontaneous Symmetry Breaking Possible? Understanding Wigner's Theorem in Light of Unitary Inequivalence. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 44 (4):464-469.
Laura Ruetsche (2011). Why Be Normal? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 42 (2):107-115.

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