David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 109 (2):263 - 280 (1996)
How can it be rational to work on a new theory that does not yet meet the standards for good or acceptable theories? If diversity of approaches is a condition for scientific progress, how can a scientific community achieve such progress when each member does what it is rational to do, namely work on the best theory? These two methodological problems, the problem of pursuit and the problem of diversity, can be solved by taking into account the cognitive risk that is involved in theory choice. I compare this solution to other proposals, in particular T. S. Kuhn's and P. Kitcher's view that the two problems demonstrate the epistemic significance of the scientific community.
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References found in this work BETA
Philip Kitcher (1993). The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions. Oxford University Press.
Thomas S. Kuhn (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Vol. The University of Chicago Press.
L. Laudan (1977). Progress and its Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth. University of California Press.
Isaac Levi (1980). The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance. The MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Dunja Šešelja & Christian Straßer (2014). Epistemic Justification in the Context of Pursuit: A Coherentist Approach. Synthese 191 (13):3111-3141.
Michael Strevens (2011). Economic Approaches to Understanding Scientific Norms. Episteme 8 (2):184-200.
F. D'Agostino (2000). Incommensurability and Commensuration: Lessons From (and to) Ethico-Political Theory. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (3):429-447.
Fred D'agostino (2004). Kuhn's Risk-Spreading Argument and The Organization of Scientific Communities. Episteme 1 (3):201-209.
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