British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1):93-112 (1996)
|Abstract||Philosophers like Duhem and Cartwright have argued that there is a tension between laws' abilities to explain and to represent. Abstract laws exemplify the first quality, phenomenological laws the second. This view has both metaphysical and methodological aspects: the world is too complex to be represented by simple theories; supplementing simple theories to make them represent reality blocks their confirmation. We argue that both aspects are incompatible with recent developments in nonlinear dynamics. Confirmation procedures and modelling strategies in nonlinear dynamics show that there are simple, abstract theories that can be confirmed without encountering the problems pointed to by Cartwright.|
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