Extensions as representative objects in Frege's logic

Erkenntnis 52 (2):239-252 (2000)
Matthias Schirn has argued on a number of occasions against the interpretation of Frege's ``objects of a quite special kind'' (i.e., the objects referred to by names like `the concept F') as extensions of concepts. According to Schirn, not only are these objects not extensions, but also the idea that `the concept F' refers to objects leads to some conclusions that are counter-intuitive and incompatible with Frege's thought. In this paper, I challenge Schirn's conclusion: I want to try and argue that the assumption that `the concept F' refers to the extension of F is entirely consistent with Frege's broader views on logic and language. I shall examine each of Schirn's main arguments and show that they do not support his claim.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Ethics   Logic   Ontology
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DOI 10.1023/A:1005542812275
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