Epistemic supervenience and internalism: A trilemma

Theoria 75 (2):129-151 (2009)
Abstract
Epistemic Internalism (EI) is the claim that an agent S is justified in believing that p at a time t iff S has either an actual or potential direct awareness of the grounds or properties that confer justification on p at t . In this paper I argue that EI does not provide the proponent of EI with an intuitively clear analysis of epistemic justification. More exactly, after identifying two different versions of EI – a weak version and a strong version – I offer some general considerations for thinking that neither the weak version nor the strong version provides the proponent of EI with a plausible analysis of epistemic justification and conclude, therefore, that EI itself cannot be considered a plausible analysis of epistemic justification.
Keywords internalism  epistemic justification
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References found in this work BETA
Roderick M. Chisholm (1966). Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
Juan Comesaña (2005). We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):59–76.

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