Yes and no

Mind 109 (436):781-823 (2000)
In what does the sense of a sentential connective consist? Like many others, I hold that its sense lies in rules that govern deductions. In the present paper, however, I argue that a classical logician should take the relevant deductions to be arguments involving affirmative or negative answers to yes-or-no questions that contain the connective. An intuitionistic logician will differ in concentrating exclusively upon affirmative answers. I conclude by arguing that a well known intuitionistic criticism of classical logic fails if the answer "No" is accorded parity with the answer "Yes"
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/mind/109.436.781
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
David Ripley (2013). Paradoxes and Failures of Cut. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):139 - 164.
Ian Rumfitt (2014). I—Truth and Meaning. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):21-55.

View all 30 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

70 ( #48,561 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #231,316 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.