David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Critical Review 7 (2-3):381-397 (1993)
Paul Davidson's critique of O'Driscoll and Rizzo is based on an ?official? philosophical position that turns on an opposition between knowledge and ignorance (in epistemology) and a corresponding opposition between ergodic and nonergodic processes (in ontology). But Davidson's substantive analysis reveals a very different ?unofficial? position, based on ?sensible expectations? and a realist ontology of enduring social structures. While O'Driscoll and Rizzo have the edge on Davidson in terms of their characterization of agents? beliefs, their ontology of event regularities is ultimately the same, and suffers from the same drawbacks, as Davidson's official ontology. The solution to some of these problems may lie in adopting an ontology similar to the one Davidson invokes in his unofficial capacity.
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Citations of this work BETA
Paul Lewis (2013). Hayek, Social Theory, and the Contrastive Explanation of Socio-Economic Order. Critical Review 25 (3-4):386-408.
Paul A. Lewis (2011). On the Merits of Critical Realism and the “Ontological Turn” in Economics: Reply to Steele. Critical Review 23 (1-2):207-230.
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