David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Topics 39 (1):99-120 (2011)
In this paper, I claim that extant empirical data do not support a radically embodied understanding of the mind but, instead, suggest (along with a variety of other results) a massively representational view. According to this massively representational view, the brain is rife with representations that possess overlapping and redundant content, and many of these represent other mental representations or derive their content from them. Moreover, many behavioral phenomena associated with attention and consciousness are best explained by the coordinated activity of units with redundant content. I finish by arguing that this massively representational picture challenges the reliability of a priori theorizing about consciousness.
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy General Interest Philosophy of Mind|
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Citations of this work BETA
Daniel D. Hutto & Glenda Satne (2015). The Natural Origins of Content. Philosophia 43 (3):521-536.
David Silverman (2016). Tying the Knot: Why Representationalists Should Endorse the Sensorimotor Theory of Conscious Feel. Philosophical Quarterly:pqv097.
Bryce Huebner (2015). Do Emotions Play a Constitutive Role in Moral Cognition? Topoi 34 (2):427-440.
Bryce Huebner & Robert D. Rupert (2014). Massively Representational Minds Are Not Always Driven by Goals, Conscious or Otherwise. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (2):145-146.
Daniel D. Hutto (forthcoming). Basic Social Cognition Without Mindreading: Minding Minds Without Attributing Contents. Synthese:1-20.
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