From Hacking’s Plurality of Styles of Scientific Reasoning to “Foliated” Pluralism: A Philosophically Robust Form of Ontologico-Methodological Pluralism
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1212-1222 (2011)
This essay aims at proposing a “philosophically important” form of scientific pluralism that captures essential features of contemporary scientific pratice largely ignored by the various forms of scientific pluralism currently discussed by philosophers. My starting point is Hacking’s concept of style of scentific reasoning, with a focus on its ontological import. I extend Hacking’s thesis by proposing the process of “ontological enrichment” to grasp how the objects created by a style articulate with the common objects of scientific inquiry “out there in the world”. The result is “foliated pluralism”, which puts to the fore the transdisciplinary and cumulative ways of proceeding in science, as well as the historical dimension of the genesis of scientific objects
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References found in this work BETA
P. F. Strawson (1950). On Referring. Mind 59 (235):320-344.
Ian Hacking (1992). 'Style' for Historians and Philosophers. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 23 (1):1-20.
Citations of this work BETA
Jeroen Van Bouwel (2015). Towards Democratic Models of Science. Exploring the Case of Scientific Pluralism. Perspectives on Science 23 (2):149-172.
David Ludwig (2016). Overlapping Ontologies and Indigenous Knowledge. From Integration to Ontological Self-Determination. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 59:36-45.
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