David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 151 (3):325 - 330 (2006)
Ontology is taken by Moulines as supervenient on science: what kinds of things there are is determined by our well-confirmed theories. But the fact is that today, science provides us with a multiplicity of well-confirmed theories, each having its own ontological commitments. The modest, ontological form of reduction advocated by Moulines (this volume) restores hope of putting some ontological order in the “huge chaotic supermarket of science”. In this paper I show that any claim on the amount of order obtained by reduction does not only always remain “temporally qualified” but, worse for the reductionist with a taste for ontological order, that the very notion of orderliness must be relativized to the capacities and interests of knowers.
|Keywords||Ontology Order Reductionism Semantic view of theories Supervenience Unity of science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Nancy Cartwright (1999). The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science. Cambridge University Press.
John Dupré (1993). The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science. Harvard University Press.
Ernest Nagel (1961). The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. Harcourt, Brace & World.
Lawrence Sklar (1985). Philosophy and Spacetime Physics. University of California Press.
Stéphanie Ruphy (2003). Is the World Really “Dappled”? A Response to Cartwright's Charge Against “Cross‐Wise Reduction”. Philosophy of Science 70 (1):57-67.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Erik Weber (2006). Are There Ontological Explanations? Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 91 (1):277-283.
Dirk Greimann (2009). Contextual Definition and Ontological Commitment. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):357 – 373.
Hans-Johann Glock (2002). Does Ontology Exist? Philosophy 77 (2):235-260.
Johanna Oksala (2010). Foucault's Politicization of Ontology. Continental Philosophy Review 43 (4):445-466.
John H. Harris (1982). The Apparent Inconsistency of Moulines' Treatment of Equilibrium Thermodynamics. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:304 - 311.
C. Ulises Moulines (2006). Reply to Ruphy. Synthese 151 (3):331 - 334.
Jesús P. Zamora Bonilla (1995). Moulines Y El Realismo. Theoria 10 (1):193-208.
C. Ulises Moulines (2001). Ontology, Reduction, and the Unity of Science. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2001:19-27.
C. Ulises Moulines (2006). Ontology, Reduction, Emergence: A General Frame. Synthese 151 (3):313-323.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads9 ( #351,306 of 1,793,170 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #344,170 of 1,793,170 )
How can I increase my downloads?