British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (1):1-11 (2007)
|Abstract||University of Colorado, Boulder If there are laws of psychology, they would seem to hold only ceteris paribus (c.p., hereafter), i.e., other things being equal. If a person wants that q and believes that doing a is the most efficient way to make it the case that q, then she will attempt to do a—but not, however, if she believes that a carries with it consequences much more hated than q is liked, or she believes she is incapable of doing a, or she gets distracted from her goal that q, or she suddenly has a severe brain hemorrhage, or.... No one can say precisely where the list ends, but the idea is supposed to be clear enough: normally the law holds, but there are many cases, exceptions, one might say, in which the law does not; the difficulty of characterizing these exceptions invites the qualification ‘c.p.’ as a catch-all|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jerry A. Fodor (1991). You Can Fool Some of the People All of the Time, Everything Else Being Equal: Hedged Laws and Psychological Explanation. Mind 100 (397):19-34.
Andreas Hüttemann, Alexander Reutlinger & Gerhard Schurz, Ceteris Paribus Laws. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Bernhard Nickel (2010). Ceteris Paribus Laws: Generics and Natural Kinds. Philosophers' Imprint 10 (06).
Markus Schrenk (2007). Can Capacities Rescue Us From Ceteris Paribus Laws? In B. Gnassounou & M. Kistler (eds.), Dispositions in Philosophy and Science. Ashgate.
Martin Carrier (1998). In Defense of Psychological Laws. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (3):217 – 232.
Stephen R. Schiffer (1991). Ceteris Paribus Laws. Mind 100 (397):1-17.
Markus Schrenk (2003). Real Ceteris Paribus Laws. In R. Bluhm & C. Nimtz (eds.), Proceedings of GAP.5, Bielefeld 2003. mentis.
Robert D. Rupert (2008). Ceteris Paribus Laws, Component Forces, and the Nature of Special-Science Properties. Noûs 42 (3):349-380.
Jerome C. Wakefield (2002). Broad Versus Narrow Content in the Explanation of Action: Fodor on Frege Cases. Philosophical Psychology 15 (2):119-33.
Christopher Gauker (2005). The Belief-Desire Law. Facta Philosophica 7 (2):121-144.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads13 ( #88,007 of 549,359 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,397 of 549,359 )
How can I increase my downloads?