Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility

Oxford University Press (1995)
Abstract
In this book, Russell examines Hume's notion of free will and moral responsibility. It is widely held that Hume presents us with a classic statement of a compatibilist position--that freedom and responsibility can be reconciled with causation and, indeed, actually require it. Russell argues that this is a distortion of Hume's view, because it overlooks the crucial role of moral sentiment in Hume's picture of human nature. Hume was concerned to describe the regular mechanisms which generate moral sentiments such as responsibility, and Russell argues that his conception of free will must be interprted within this naturalistic framework. He goes on to discuss Hume's views about the nature and character of moral sentiment; the extent to which we have control over our moral character; and the justification of punishment. Throughout, Russell argues that the naturalistic avenue of interpretation of Hume's thought, far from draining it of its contemporary interest and significance, reveals it to be of great relevance to the ongoing contemporary debate.
Keywords Free will and determinism  Responsibility
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book $16.00 used (55% off)   $27.50 new (22% off)   $31.50 direct from Amazon (10% off)    Amazon page
Call number B1499.E8.R87 1995
ISBN(s) 0195152905   9780195152906  
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,928
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Chauncey Maher (2010). On Being and Holding Responsible. Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):129-140.
Richard Stalley (2012). Adam Smith and the Theory of Punishment. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (1):69-89.

View all 6 citations

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

34 ( #50,478 of 1,100,501 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #80,501 of 1,100,501 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.