David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (1995)
In this book, Russell examines Hume's notion of free will and moral responsibility. It is widely held that Hume presents us with a classic statement of a compatibilist position--that freedom and responsibility can be reconciled with causation and, indeed, actually require it. Russell argues that this is a distortion of Hume's view, because it overlooks the crucial role of moral sentiment in Hume's picture of human nature. Hume was concerned to describe the regular mechanisms which generate moral sentiments such as responsibility, and Russell argues that his conception of free will must be interprted within this naturalistic framework. He goes on to discuss Hume's views about the nature and character of moral sentiment; the extent to which we have control over our moral character; and the justification of punishment. Throughout, Russell argues that the naturalistic avenue of interpretation of Hume's thought, far from draining it of its contemporary interest and significance, reveals it to be of great relevance to the ongoing contemporary debate.
|Keywords||Free will and determinism Responsibility Hume|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Reprint years||1996, 2002|
|Buy the book||$16.00 used (59% off) $19.08 new (52% off) $38.95 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||B1499.E8.R87 1995|
|ISBN(s)||0195152905 9780195152906 9780195095012|
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Citations of this work BETA
Shaun Nichols (2007). After Incompatibilism: A Naturalistic Defense of the Reactive Attitudes. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):405-428.
Michael S. McKenna (2005). Where Frankfurt and Strawson Meet. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):163-180.
Gregg D. Caruso (2015). Free Will Eliminativism: Reference, Error, and Phenomenology. Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2823-2833.
Yuval Avnur (2016). Excuses for Hume's Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):264-306.
David Shoemaker (2009). Responsibility and Disability. Metaphilosophy 40 (3-4):438-461.
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