David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):47-69 (2011)
This paper addresses questions about how the levels of causality (generic and single-case causality) are related. One question is epistemological: can relationships at one level be evidence for relationships at the other level? We present three kinds of answer to this question, categorised according to whether inference is top-down, bottom-up, or the levels are independent. A second question is metaphysical: can relationships at one level be reduced to relationships at the other level? We present three kinds of answer to this second question, categorised according to whether single-case relations are reduced to generic, generic relations are reduced to single-case, or the levels are independent. We then explore causal inference in autopsy. This is an interesting case study, we argue, because it refutes all three epistemologies and all three metaphysics. We close by sketching an account of causality that survives autopsy—the epistemic theory
|Keywords||Causality Causal inference Autopsy Epistemic theory|
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References found in this work BETA
Carl F. Craver (2007). Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press.
Nancy Cartwright (1989). Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement. Oxford University Press.
Nancy Cartwright (1999). The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science. Cambridge University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Brendan Clarke, Donald Gillies, Phyllis Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (2014). Mechanisms and the Evidence Hierarchy. Topoi 33 (2):339-360.
Phyllis McKay Illari (2011). Mechanistic Evidence: Disambiguating the Russo–Williamson Thesis. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):139 - 157.
Donald Gillies & Aidan Sudbury (2013). Should Causal Models Always Be Markovian? The Case of Multi-Causal Forks in Medicine. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (3):275-308.
Raffaella Campaner & Maria Carla Galavotti (2012). Evidence and the Assessment of Causal Relations in the Health Sciences. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (1):27 - 45.
Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (2012). EnviroGenomarkers: The Interplay Between Mechanisms and Difference Making in Establishing Causal Claims. Medicine Studies 3 (4):249-262.
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